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D221. Introduction
Imports have large positive effects on ﬁrm productivity (Amiti and
Konings, 2007; Halpern et al., 2015), yet there is much heterogeneity
in similar ﬁrms' importing behavior. One explanation for this heteroge-
neity is thepresenceof informal trade barriers,when speciﬁc knowledge
or a trustedpartner is needed for aproductive import relationship.When
informal barriers are active, importing may diffuse from ﬁrm to ﬁrm
through personal and business connections. Mion and Opromolla
(2014), Mion et al. (2016), Fernandes and Tang (2014) and Kamal and
Sundaram (2016) document such diffusion for exports, but at present
we have limited evidence on the—equally important— import side of
the market.1,2 Are there knowledge spillovers in importing? If there
are, what factors facilitate or limit diffusion? The answers can shedtray), korenm@ceu.edu
rade in detail below.
imports: ﬁnding a foreign sup-
sing the supply of, but decreas-
.V. This is an open access article undlight on the puzzling cross-ﬁrm heterogeneity in importing and its pro-
ductivity beneﬁts; and can guide trade policy to exploit indirect effects.
In this paper we use ﬁrm-level data from Hungary to document and
analyze knowledge diffusion in importing. In doing so, we make three
main contributions. First, we develop a portfolio of empirical designs
which rule out many alternative explanations and help advance the
identiﬁcation of trade spillovers in spatial and managerial networks.
We address ﬁrm heterogeneity by identifying from source country
variation, exclude spatial omitted variables by exploiting the precise
neighborhood structure, and also use plausibly exogenous ﬁrm moves.
We consistently ﬁnd signiﬁcant spillover effects. Second, we investigate
the factors associated with stronger diffusion. We ﬁnd that knowledge
ﬂows are stronger when ﬁrms or peers are larger or more productive.
Knowledge ﬂows also exhibit complementarities in ﬁrm and peer pro-
ductivity, showing that positive sorting can increase the overall adop-
tion of importing. Third, we demonstrate in a counterfactual analysis
how network density and positive sorting combine to shape adoption
patterns. We document that the model-implied social multiplier of
importing is highly skewed in the number and type of peers, implying
that import subsidies targeted at ﬁrms in buildings with many produc-
tive neighbors are much more effective.
In Section 2we present our data.We use a ﬁrm-level panel that con-
tains rich information about Hungarian ﬁrms during 1993–2003. Weer the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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data from the National Tax and Customs Administration, and trade data
from the Hungarian Customs Statistics.3 The ﬁrm register contains, for
the full universe of Hungarian ﬁrms, the precise address of the ﬁrm, all
owners with their country of origin, and all ﬁrm ofﬁcials with signing
rights, as well as changes over time. As a result, we can trace changes
in spatial and ownership links and the moves of people. The balance
sheet data include additional information on the foreign ownership
share and the industry of ﬁrms. And the customs data contain annual
export and import ﬂows at the HS6 product level for each ﬁrm, sepa-
rately for each destination and source country.
Section 3 presents ourﬁrstmain contribution: the empirical strategy
and results on import spillovers. The key identiﬁcation concernwith es-
timating spillovers is one common to studies of peer effects (Manski,
1993): that a ﬁrm and its peer's import choices may be correlated for
reasonsunrelated to learning. For example,ﬁrms in a particular industry
may make correlated location and import decisions. We address this
endogeneity problem using two main research designs exploiting pro-
gressively narrower sources of variation, in combination with placebo
tests and sample deﬁnition choices that rule out several omitted
variables.
Our ﬁrst research design is a linear probability model measuring the
effect of peer ﬁrms'country-speciﬁc experience on a ﬁrm's decision
about starting to import from the same country. We implement this de-
sign by including ﬁrm-year and country-year ﬁxed effects, effectively
exploiting variation within a ﬁrm in a given year: we ask if having a
peerwhichhas past experiencewith a given country increases the prob-
ability of starting to import from that country, rather than from another
country. To increase comparabilitywe only look at four source countries
similar in terms of imports: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and
Russia. And to ensure that all ﬁrms are the same distance from the bor-
der we only consider ﬁrms located in Budapest.
We use this research design to estimate knowledge diffusion in two
networks: close spatial neighborhoods andmanagerial networks.Within
spatial neighborhoodsweconsider three typesof peers:ﬁrms in the same
building, ﬁrms in the two neighboring buildings, and, as a placebo, ﬁrms
in the two closest cross-street buildings. In managerial networks, we de-
ﬁnepeers asﬁrms fromwhich anofﬁcialwith signing rights hasmoved to
the ﬁrmof interest. To limit confounding effectswe always exclude own-
ership-connectedﬁrms—deﬁned as thosewhich share anultimate owner
with the ﬁrm of interest—from the spatial and managerial peer groups.
Our ﬁrst design yields signiﬁcant positive import diffusion estimates
in both networks. For neighborhood networkswedocument highly spa-
tially localized spillovers. Having a same-building peer with import ex-
perience from a speciﬁc country increases the probability of starting to
import from the same country by 0.2 percentage points, which roughly
doubles the baseline probability of starting to import from one of the
four countries. The effect of a neighbor-building peer's import experi-
ence is only one-ﬁfth as large, indicating fast decay by distance.4 The
placebo effect of a cross-street peer's import experience is insigniﬁcant
and small. Finally, in managerial networks the same design yields spill-
over estimates which are twice as large as the same-building effect.
This design addresses several omitted variable problems which
often plague estimates of knowledge diffusion. Most directly, by
exploiting variation across source countries it addresses the basic con-
cern that importers tend to be connected to other importers. Speciﬁ-
cally, in the absence of source country variation the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed
effects would soak up all the variation in peers' import experience.5 In3 While ﬁrm register and balance sheet data cover a longer period, we do not have ac-
cess to detailed trade data after 2003.
4 We also estimate a decay coefﬁcient and ﬁnd it to be similar to but somewhat higher
than existing within-city spillover decay estimates. This conﬁrms the pattern in the liter-
ature that knowledge spillovers are spatially concentrated and suggests that building
boundaries may be particularly important barriers in our context.
5 Mion et al. (2016) also use ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects in their study of the export experi-
ence of managers moving across ﬁrms.addition, our controls and placebo also address more subtle country-
speciﬁc omitted variables. In particular, by controlling for ownership
links we remove omitted variables based on joint ownership. Results
below show evidence on diffusion across industries, addressing con-
cerns with same-industry clustering. And, most important, the neigh-
boring building versus cross-street building comparison rules out any
remaining omitted variable as long as knowledge spillovers decay faster
than the spatial correlation in that variable.
One remaining concern with our ﬁrst design is that it does not make
explicit the source of variation in peer ﬁrms' experience, and therefore it
may be subject to some unspeciﬁed—highly spatially concentrated—
omitted variable. In our second design we address this problem by
exploiting a concrete plausibly exogenous source of variation: ﬁrm
moves. We conduct an event study of the impact of ﬁrms with coun-
try-speciﬁc import experience moving into an address where no such
experience was present earlier. The move is a positive shock to local
country-speciﬁc knowledge. We show that ﬁrms located in such an ad-
dress start to import from the country known by the mover with a
higher probability than from other countries, relative to ﬁrms in ad-
dresses where the mover had no such experience. Consistent with the
logic of diffusion, the response of imports to the move is gradual. The
magnitude of the estimate is comparable to that of our ﬁrst research de-
sign. The consistency of the results identiﬁed in different networks and
from increasingly narrow sources of variation further supports the
knowledge spillovers interpretation.
In Section 4we present our secondmain contribution: the heteroge-
neity of the spillover effect. We explore heterogeneity both to internally
validate our estimates and to obtain lessons about mechanisms. We
measure heterogeneous effects both by the characteristics of the ﬁrm
and those of the peer, as well as their interactions. Focusing on same-
building peers, we ﬁnd that larger, more productive and foreign-
owned ﬁrms beneﬁt more from peers' import experience. Firms also
learn more from peers which are larger, more productive or foreign-
owned. And spillovers are also stronger when more peers have import
knowledge. These results are all consistent with the knowledge diffu-
sion interpretation: better ﬁrms are likely to be both more receptive
to information and more effective in passing it on, and multiple sources
should further increase the rate of diffusion.6
We then document that the strength of the spillover also exhibits
complementarities between the ﬁrm's and the peer's characteristics.
We show that high-productivity ﬁrms tend to learn even more from
higher-productivity peers than low-productivity ﬁrms do. Similarly,
we show that the effect of peers operating in the same industry or
importing the same product category is signiﬁcantly larger than that
of other peers. At the same time, spillovers from peers operating in dif-
ferent industries or importing different product types are still signiﬁ-
cant. The results on complementarities are potentially relevant
because they suggest that positive sorting—even holding ﬁxed the net-
work structure—can generate aggregate gains in importing.
In Section 5we present our thirdmain contribution: a counterfactual
analysis to assess the policy implications of the estimated import spill-
over effect. Our results so far imply that spillovers should be stronger
when (i) the number, and (ii) the productivity of experienced peers is
higher. To quantitatively evaluate the combined impact of these forces,
we compute the model-implied social multiplier effect on imports of a
ﬁrm entering into an import market, which incorporates spillovers
over the next ﬁve years. We calculate the multiplier using the same-
building estimate which accounts for heterogeneity by the productivity
of the ﬁrm and its peers, and also allows for an increase in spillovers
with thenumber of experienced peers. Because the number andproduc-
tivity of peers varies across the sample, we obtain a separate multiplier
for each ﬁrmwhich has not imported yet from one of the four countries.6 The effects are broadly similar but weaker for neighbor-building and managerial
connections.
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ticular, we ﬁnd that the ﬁve-year social multiplier is 1.03 for the median
ﬁrm and 1.13 for the ﬁrm in the 90th percentile. Thus, while accounting
for spillovers is not important for the typical ﬁrm, it is potentially quite
important for a substantial share of ﬁrms. An implication is that there
may be signiﬁcant gains from targeting trade policies. We conﬁrm this
by showing that a targeted import subsidy policy treating ﬁrms for
which spillover effects are the largest can be 26% more effective than a
non-targetedone. Becauseﬁnding theﬁrmswith thehighest expected in-
direct treatment effect only requires public information on ﬁrms' balance
sheet and address, this targeting is in principle directly implementable.
Our result quantiﬁes the beneﬁt of clusters—especially of ﬁrms with
high productivity—in facilitating the diffusion of good business practices.
1.1. Literature
We build on a literature on knowledge spillovers in trade, most of
which studies the diffusion of exporting. An important part of the liter-
ature explores spatial spillovers. Early work focused on the diffusion of
the decision to export, and obtained mixed results.7 More recent work
studies the diffusion of speciﬁc knowledge, such as export experience
with a particular country or product, and generally ﬁnds evidence for
spillovers (Koenig, 2009; Koenig et al., 2010; Poncet and Mayneris,
2013; Castillo and Silvente, 2011; Ramos and Moral-Benito, 2013;
Mayneris and Poncet, 2015). Using uniquely rich data on trade partners
Kamal and Sundaram (2016) document the diffusion of concrete export
partners. And Fernandes and Tang (2014) document export spillovers
using for guidance a formal model that allows them to test speciﬁc pre-
dictions of the learning hypothesis.
All these papers deﬁne spatial neighborhoods to be cities or similarly
large agglomerations. Our spatial spillover results improve identiﬁca-
tion by using substantially more precise measures of neighborhoods.
When networking beneﬁts decay rapidly in space (Arzaghi and
Henderson, 2008), spatial networks should be measured at a ﬁne reso-
lution to avoid confounding variation from omitted spatially correlated
variables. Our results show that spillovers dodecay fast, highlighting the
relevance of our precise measures. More broadly, we also contribute to
this literature by our focus on imports, our analysis of heterogeneous ef-
fects and the implications for targeted trade policies.
Another part of the export spillovers literature studies spillovers
through managerial moves. These papers show that having a manager
with prior export experience join the ﬁrm increases the likelihood
that the ﬁrm starts to export (Choquette and Meinen, 2015; Mion and
Opromolla, 2014; Mion et al., 2016; Sala and Yalcin, 2015; Masso et
al., 2015). We contribute to this work by focusing on import spillovers;
by having a comprehensive study in which we compare spillovers in
managerial networks to spillovers in spatial networks; and by our anal-
ysis of heterogeneous effects and the implications for targeted policies.
Given this existing work on export spillovers, our main focus in this
paper is the more novel and equally important topic of import spill-
overs. There is almost no work on this topic, the sole exceptions—to
our knowledge—being Harasztosi (2011) and Harasztosi (2013),
which estimate import spillovers in Hungarian NUTS4 agglomeration
units. Our contribution to this work is the use of more precise neighbor-
hood deﬁnitions, a variety of empirical designs that limit confounding
factors, amore comprehensive analysis ofmultiple networks, the results
on heterogeneous effects, and the policy counterfactual analysis.
Finally, we build on a literature on ﬁrm networks and diffusion in
networks. Chaney (2014) develops a model in which ﬁrms can acquire
trading partners through existing contacts; Fafchamps and Quinn
(2015) and Cai and Szeidl (2018) show that managerial meetings can
facilitate the diffusion of business relevant information; and Banerjee7 For example, Aitken et al. (1997), Barrios et al. (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2004),
Lawless (2009) and Pupato (2010) found negative results, while Clerides et al. (1998),
Lovely et al. (2005), Greenaway and Kneller (2008) and Dumont et al. (2010) found pos-
itive effects.et al. (2013) explore network-based targeting of microﬁnance in the
presence of knowledge diffusion. Our study documents and analyzes
these sort of network effects in the novel and important context of im-
port spillovers.
2. Data
2.1. Data sources
Wecreate our panel of Hungarian importers by combining data from
three sources.
2.1.1. Firm registry 1993–2003
Data from the Hungarian Company Register contain basic informa-
tion for the full universe of Hungarian ﬁrms, including the ﬁrm's name,
tax identiﬁer, and precise address: zip code, city, street, number, ﬂoor
and door number. These variables have associated start and end dates,
allowing us to track ﬁrmmoves over time. The registry data also contain
information about the ﬁrm's owners, and ofﬁcials with signing rights
which include directors, boardmembers, the CEO, and some employees.
As the employeeswith signing rights are usually at or near the top of the
ﬁrm hierarchy, we sometimes—slightly imprecisely—refer to these peo-
ple asmanagers. For ﬁrm owners the data contain the name and registry
number; and for person owners and ofﬁcials the name, mother's name
and home address. These records also have start and end dates. We use
the name, mother's name and address to create an anonymous unique
identiﬁer for each individual in the data. We use this identiﬁer to track
individuals across ﬁrms and over time. Our method allows for typos
and slight variations in names, such as omitting the middle name.
2.1.2. Balance sheets 1993–2003
We have balance sheet data for all double-bookkeeping Hungarian
ﬁrms from the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary.
These data also include the ﬁrm's industry at the 2-digitNACE level (Re-
vision 1.1), and the shares of its capital owned by foreign entities, do-
mestic private entities, and the Hungarian state.
2.1.3. International trade 1993–2003
Detailed ﬁrm-level trade data come from the Hungarian Customs
Statistics. These data contain yearly exports and imports by each ﬁrm
to and from each foreign country at the Harmonized System (HS)
6-digit product category. The reason that our sample period ends in
2003 is that the ﬁrm-level trade data are not available for later years.
We use unique ﬁrm identiﬁers to link these three datasets.
2.2. Main sample and variable deﬁnitions
2.2.1. Firm sample
We focus on imports from four countries that are comparable in
terms of their exports to Hungarian ﬁrms: the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Romania and Russia. To avoid variation in distance from the border, we
use only ﬁrms with headquarters in Budapest, which account for over
20% of all the ﬁrms in Hungary. Accordingly, when a ﬁrm moves its
headquarters out of Budapest, we let it exit from our sample. These ex-
clusions result in our main ﬁrm sample which contains 211,598 ﬁrms
and 1,189,402 ﬁrm-year observations.
We conduct most of the analysis using our analysis sample, a (ﬁrm,
source country, year) panel derived from our main ﬁrm sample. In this
three-way panel we only include observations in which a ﬁrm in the
main sample has not yet imported from the given source country up
until the previous year. This sample construction allows us to estimate
the probability that a ﬁrm starts to import from a particular country
for the ﬁrst time. We also make three additional exclusions. (1) We ex-
clude ﬁrms for which the headquarters' address is missing, because for
them we cannot deﬁne spatial networks. (2) We exclude ﬁrms which
have N50 same-building peers to ensure that our results are not driven
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
All importers from
All
ﬁrms
Any of the
4 countries
Czech
Republic
Slovakia Romania Russia
Number of ﬁrms 211,598 10,575 5807 4534 3534 2005
Age 5.5 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.4
(3.8) (5.7) (5.6) (5.8) (5.1) (6.7)
Number of
employees
8 124 104 118 124 191
(229) (1515) (1258) (1422) (1637) (2073)
Log sales 9.0 12.1 12.2 12.1 11.8 12.1
(2.1) (2.4) (2.2) (2.3) (2.5) (2.7)
Export share 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.21
(0.17) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.31)
Log total factor
productivity
0.00 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.07
(0.97) (1.08) (1.04) (1.07) (1.08) (1.22)
Share of
foreign-owned
0.13 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.36
(0.33) (0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.48)
Share of
state-owned
0.004 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.027
(0.060) (0.134) (0.127) (0.133) (0.126) (0.162)
Number of
distinct
addresses
78,453 9428 5403 4617 3648 2221
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrms with headquarters in Budapest, 1993–2003. We report log
total factor productivity as the difference from the 2-digit industry average in Budapest.
Standard deviations are in parentheses below the sample averages.
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for the Czech Republic and Slovakia are only available starting 1993 and
the analysis sample requires importer status of peers in the previous
year.8,9 After these exclusions, the analysis sample contains 88% of the
ﬁrms in the main ﬁrm sample and has 3,778,517 ﬁrm-year-country
observations. About 5% of the ﬁrms in the main sample import from at
least one of the four countries at least in one year during 1993–2003.
2.2.2. Variable deﬁnitions
We deﬁne the ﬁrm to have import experience with a country in a
year if it has imported from that country in that year or in a previous
year. This deﬁnition captures the idea that the ﬁrm has acquired import
experience speciﬁc to that country by that year. We deﬁne experience
with exports or with foreign owners in an analogous way. We classify
a ﬁrm as foreign-owned in a year if it had majority foreign ownership
that year.
We classify imported products by their purpose using the Broad Eco-
nomic Categories (BEC) classiﬁcation. We create four product catego-
ries: Consumer goods (BEC 1, 6), Industrial supplies (BEC 2, 3), Capital
goods (BEC 41, 51, 52) and Parts and accessories (BEC 42, 53).
Using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology we estimate
from the balance sheet data total factor productivity (TFP) for each
ﬁrm ineach year, assumingaCobb-Douglas revenueproduction function
with capital and labor as factors andmaterials as an input, allowing coef-
ﬁcients to vary by two-digit industries. We normalize log productivity
within each 2-digit industry to havemean zero in ourmain ﬁrm sample.
We thenassignﬁrms toproductivity quartiles in eachyear t, basedon the
average of their yearly 2-digit-industry-speciﬁc productivity percentile
over the years t− 2, t−1 and t. Taking the average over three years re-
ducesnoise, and results in a smoothbut time-varyingproductivity index.
2.3. Firm networks
A key ingredient in our analysis is data on peers in ﬁrm networks.
We work with three classes of peers, deﬁned based on spatial, personal
and ownership connections.
2.3.1. Spatial peers
We use a highly localized deﬁnition of spatial connections. We create
three different spatial peer groups. (i) Same-building peers, deﬁned as
ﬁrms with the same street address up to building number. (ii) Neigh-
bor-building peers, deﬁned for a ﬁrmwith building number n as ﬁrms in
buildings in the same street with numbers n − 2 and n + 2.10 (iii)
Cross-street peers, deﬁned as ﬁrms in buildings in the same street num-
bered n − 1 and n + 1. From all three peer groups we exclude ﬁrms
which have an ownership link—as deﬁned below—to the ﬁrm of interest
in the given year. Because the address data has dates, all these peer groups
are year speciﬁc.
2.3.2. Person-connected peers
Wedeﬁne a ﬁrm B to be a person-connected peer of ﬁrm A in year t if
some person X is an ofﬁcial with signing rights of ﬁrm A in year t and
was an ofﬁcial with signing rights of ﬁrm B at some earlier date. We
will often focus on person connections that can transmit import experi-
ence with some country c, which happens when ﬁrm B had import
experience with c before person X left that ﬁrm.8 For the same reason we cannot include ﬁrms in the ﬁrst year they appear in the data.
We also exclude those observations—1550 ﬁrm-year pairs—in which the ﬁrm has no ad-
dress data from the previous year and no spatial peers coming from the previous year
can be deﬁned.
9 Aswe havenodata onﬁrms' import history before 1992/1993,we cannot rule out that
ﬁrms classiﬁed as not yet importers already imported from the country before 1992. In a
robustness checkweuse themore recent part of our analysis sample, 1998–2003, inwhich
we can rule out that not-yet-importer ﬁrms have a recent unobserved import experience
with the country.
10 Streets in Budapest have an even and an odd side.In all person-connected deﬁnitions we exclude people with signing
rights who are liquidators—ofﬁcials assigned to handle liquidation of
the company—as well as people who are ofﬁcials or owners of N15
ﬁrms in the given year. We also exclude from the set of person-con-
nected peers ﬁrms which are likely to have shared decision makers
with theﬁrmof interest: those ever connected to theﬁrm through own-
ership links (as deﬁned below), and those that have the exact same ad-
dress including ﬂoor and door number. But we do include peer ﬁrms
which are located outside Budapest.
With slight imprecision, we sometimes refer to the person-con-
nected network deﬁned this way as the managerial network.
2.3.3. Ownership-connected peers
We classify ﬁrms A and B to be linked by ownership in year t if they
have a commonultimate owner. This includes two types of connections:
(1) when A and B have a direct or indirect common owner; (2) when
one of the ﬁrms is a direct or indirect owner of the other. We also in-
clude peers located outside Budapest in the ownership-connected
peer group of a ﬁrm.
2.4. Summary statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the ﬁrms in our main sam-
ple. The ﬁrst column refers to all ﬁrms in all years, the second column to
ﬁrms in years in which they have already had import experience from
one of our four source countries, and the remaining columns to ﬁrms
with import experience from speciﬁc countries.
Comparing between columns 1 and 2 shows that importers are on
average older, larger, more likely to be foreign owned,more likely to ex-
port, and have higher productivity than the industry average. These pat-
terns are familiar (Bernard et al., 2009). The remaining columns show
that importers from the four countries of interest are fairly similar in
terms of all the variables in the table, consistent with our intuition
that these source countries are roughly similar in terms of their associ-
ated import barriers.
Table 2 shows the number of ﬁrms and importers over time during
our sample period. The rapid increase in the number of ﬁrms is likely
due to the development of the capitalist economy in the 1990s. And
the increase in the number of importers is probably a consequence of
several factors: more ﬁrms, lower formal trade barriers, and a country
more deeply embedded in the international economy. The considerable
Table 2
Number of ﬁrms and importers by year.
Year Number of ﬁrms
Importing from
Total Any of the 4
countries
Czech
Republic
Slovakia Romania Russia
1993 50,982 1810 753 758 563 509
1994 63,592 2702 1175 1225 754 675
1995 74,516 3514 1642 1599 956 822
1996 86,702 4197 2029 1905 1127 937
1997 99,858 4885 2489 2185 1381 1025
1998 113,366 5530 2916 2410 1631 1137
1999 122,407 6064 3304 2588 1786 1231
2000 133,031 6578 3683 2784 2018 1292
2001 142,433 6989 3948 2955 2211 1338
2002 148,574 7305 4207 3095 2382 1365
2003 153,941 7696 4506 3311 2620 1386
Notes: Sample includesﬁrmswith headquarters in Budapest, 1993–2003. Aﬁrm is deﬁned
to be importing from a country if it has imported at least once from that country by the
given year.
Table 3
Number of peers in various networks.
Number of peers Percent of ﬁrms in 2003 with n peers in
Same
building
Neighbor
building
Cross-street
building
Person
network
Ownership
network
0 22.3 31.0 49.7 86.7 48.4
1 13.3 13.7 12.4 8.2 19.5
2 9.0 8.5 6.9 2.5 10.3
3 7.4 6.2 4.7 1.1 5.9
4 6.1 5.3 3.7 0.5 3.6
5 or more 41.9 35.3 22.6 1.0 12.3
Average number of
peers
8.4 5.2 3.3 0.3 4.7
Notes: Same building is the building of the ﬁrm (street number denoted n). Neighbor
building: buildings in the same street with numbers n+ 2 and n− 2. Cross-street build-
ing: buildings in the same street with numbers n+1 and n− 1. Person network: ﬁrms in
which a current manager of the ﬁrm previously had signing right. Ownership network:
ﬁrms having a common ultimate owner with the ﬁrm.
Table 4
Share of importers with experienced peers.
Firm has peers with import experience
Share of ﬁrms starting to import Only from country C From any other country
Peers in same building
Only from country C 44% 18%
From any other country 48% 78%
Peers in neighbor building
Only from country C 34% 21%
From any other country 61% 75%
Peers in person network
Only from country C 45% 18%
From any other country 44% 76%
Peers in ownership network
Only from country C 55% 14%
From any other country 41% 82%
Notes: Each value in each panel is the share of ﬁrms speciﬁed by the row of the panel rel-
ative to the sample of ﬁrms speciﬁed by the column of the panel.Weighted average across
the four countries, with the number of observations in a country as weights. Sample con-
tains ﬁrms starting to import from at least one of the four countries. Percentages in a col-
umn do not add up to 100% aswe exclude ﬁrmswhich start to import both from country C
and from another country.
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our analysis below.
Table 3 reports the distribution of degree (number of peers) in the
different ﬁrm networks. The average degree—shown in the bottom
row—is the highest for the same-building network (8.4) and the lowest
for the the person-connected network (0.3). The neighbor-building and
cross-street networks are between these two extremes (average
degrees of 5.2 and 3.3) and although the latter is more sparse, have a
roughly similar degree distribution. In all networks a substantial share
of ﬁrms are isolated, i.e. have zero neighbors. This heterogeneity in
degree across ﬁrms is one key reason for our ﬁnding below that
targeting import subsidy policies can substantially increase their
effectiveness.11
3. Estimating import spillovers
This section presents our empirical strategy and results on the effect
of peers' experience on a ﬁrm's import decision. Our main hypothesis is
that importing requires source-country speciﬁc knowledge, which in
turn diffuses in various ﬁrm networks. As a result, we predict that
ﬁrmswhich—other things equal—havepeerswith experience importing
from a particular country are more likely to start importing from that
country.
We divide this section into four parts. We begin by presentingmoti-
vating evidence which highlights a key component of the logic for iden-
tiﬁcation: variation in peers' import experience across different source
countries. We then present two empirical designs. The ﬁrst design di-
rectly exploits this source country variation, and yields spillover esti-
mates in both spatial and managerial networks as well as placebo
estimates that conﬁrm the logic of identiﬁcation. The second design fur-
ther improves identiﬁcation for spillovers in spatial networks by
exploiting plausibly exogenous ﬁrm moves. In the ﬁnal part we assess
the magnitude of our spillover estimates.
3.1. Motivating evidence
Table 4 shows howwe exploit source country variation in peers' im-
port experience. The table reports the probability of a ﬁrm starting to
import from a particular country in a year, conditional on it starting to
import from one of the four countries that year, and conditional on11 Section O1 of theOnline Appendix contains additional descriptive statistics about net-
works and imports. Figures O1-O3 and Table O1 show that importers are fairly similar
across source countries. Table O2 shows that the majority of importers imports only from
one of the four countries. Table O3 shows that patterns of experienced peers have wide
variation across ﬁrms.different importing patterns of its peers. The four panels correspond to
peers deﬁned by the same-building, neighbor-building, person-con-
nected and ownership-connected networks. Within each panel, the
top row shows the share of ﬁrms which start to import from a country
c, while the bottom row shows the share which start to import from a
different country.12 The left column computes this share for ﬁrms with
peers that have import experience with c but not the other countries;
and the right column for ﬁrms with peers that have import experience
with a different country but not c. We report the average share when
c runs across the four countries, weighted by the number of observa-
tions per country.
The table shows that in each network, the share of ﬁrms starting to
import from country c is always higher when peers have c experience
than when peers have non-c experience. This fact suggests that peers'
experience inﬂuences ﬁrms' import decisions and forms the basis for
our identiﬁcation strategy. We now turn to more fully develop this em-
pirical approach and derive statistical inference, explicitly address con-
founds, conduct placebo analysis and incorporate additional plausibly
exogenous variation.12 Percentages do not add to 100 as we exclude ﬁrms which start to import from both c
and another country.
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Our main speciﬁcation is the following linear hazard regression
equation:
Yict ¼
X
n
βnX
n
ic;t−1 þ αit þ μct þ εict : ð1Þ
Here i indexes ﬁrms, c indexes source countries and t indexes years,
thus each observation is a (ﬁrm, source country, year) triplet. We esti-
mate the regression in our analysis sample, which contains observations
where ﬁrm i has not yet imported from country c before year t. The left-
hand-side variable Yict is an indicator for i importing from country c in
year t. Given that the sample excludes prior importers from c, Yict mea-
sures entry into importing from c. On the right-hand side we include in-
dicators for the presence of country-speciﬁc import experience in
various peer groups n. Speciﬁcally, Xnic, t−1 is and indicatorwhich equals
one if there is at least one ﬁrm in ﬁrm i‘s peer group n in year t − 1
which has import experience from country c at time t − 1, that is,
which imported from c in t− 1 or earlier.13We use lagged peer experi-
ence becausewe expect information diffusion to take time.We consider
the ﬁve different peer groups (n) deﬁned in Section 2.3 above: (1) ﬁrms
in the same building; (2) ﬁrms in the two neighboring buildings, (3)
ﬁrms in the two cross-street buildings; (4) person-connected peers;
and (5) ﬁrms in the same ownership network. Finally, αit denotes
ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects, μct denotes country-year ﬁxed effects, and εict
represents other sources of variation in importing.
Our main hypothesis is that, due to knowledge spillovers, βn N 0 for
the spatial andmanagerial networks.We also expectβn N 0 for the own-
ership network, but in that network themechanism need not be a spill-
over: it is also possible that the common owner's knowledge causes
ﬁrms in the network to import from the same country.
Because they play an important role in identifying our key coefﬁ-
cients, it is useful to discuss the ﬁxed effects in Eq. (1). The ﬁrm-
year ﬁxed effects αit control for any omitted variable driving import
behavior which is speciﬁc to the given ﬁrm in the given year. This is
a rich set of ﬁxed effects, and the only reason it can be included is be-
cause the data have an additional panel dimension: multiple source
countries. In particular, estimating Eq. (1) in the absence of data on
source countries, or with a single source country, would not be feasi-
ble because the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects would soak up all the variation
in the dependent variable. In this sense the key βn coefﬁcients are
identiﬁed from source country variation. An implication is that stan-
dard ﬁrm controls, such as sales, employment, ownership status, or
other balance sheet variables need not be included in the regression,
since they are already picked up by the ﬁrm-year effects. In turn, the
second set of ﬁxed effects μct pick up country-year speciﬁc variation,
for example business cycle ﬂuctuations in a source country that
might affect the supply of imports. Due to their presence, we do not
need to include country-speciﬁc controls such as the exchange rate
or GDP of the source country.
Beyond import spillovers, slightly modiﬁed versions of Eq. (1) can
also be used to estimate other kinds of spillovers. We will look at
cross-activity spillovers where on the right-hand side of the equation
we measure peer ﬁrms'country-speciﬁc experience in a different do-
main, such as exporting to or having a foreign owner from the country;
and (in Appendix A.2) we will also use a variant to present evidence on
export spillovers.
3.2.1. Identiﬁcation
Since Eq. (1) is essentially a peer effects regression, the main
threats to identiﬁcation are those highlighted by Manski (1993):13 Subsequent speciﬁcations will reuse the notation for variables Y, X, and coefﬁcient β
with slightly differentmeaning. Tominimize the risk of confusion, we will explain the no-
tation of each estimating equation directly after it is introduced.endogenous peer groups and correlated omitted variables.14 Endoge-
nous peer groups might arise because of clustering or because of
peer choice. An example in the spatial network is when ﬁrms from
one industry, or “high-type” ﬁrms, tend to both co-locate and
make similar import decisions, creating spurious correlation between
Xnic, t−1 and εict. An example in the managerial network is when a
ﬁrm hires a manager because of her or his import knowledge. And
an example of correlated omitted variables is when particular physical
locations are better for importing from a country c, perhaps because
they are close to c.
Our ﬁrst research design addresses these concerns in three
main ways. (1) Source-country variation. By using this variation
we address the basic concern that importers tend to be connected
to other importers. As discussed above, if we were to estimate Eq.
(1) ignoring the source of imports, the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects αit
would soak up all the variation. The implication is that remaining
threats to identiﬁcation must be based on country variation: for
example, if certain types of ﬁrms tend to import from certain
countries and co-locate with each other. (2) Sample deﬁnition.
We use comparable source countries; ﬁrms based in Budapest;
and we omit ownership-based links from the spatial and manage-
rial networks. Our sample choices mitigate several concerns.
Because the source countries are similar, it is less likely that
“high-type” ﬁrms import from one, while “low-type” ﬁrms import
from another. Because all ﬁrms are in Budapest, omitted variables
based on distance from a country are muted. And by removing
ownership links we address the concern that correlated decisions
may be driven by a common owner. In addition, by focusing on
imports we limit the concern of endogenous manager choice as
knowledge of importing seems less likely to be a driver of hires
than for example knowledge of exporting would be. (3) Placebo
spatial peers. Perhaps the most convincing component of our de-
sign is that by exploiting the ﬁne spatial structure we can compare
same-building and neighbor-building spillovers with a cross-
street “placebo spillover”. As long as spillovers are more spatially
concentrated than the omitted variables—an assumption consis-
tent with the results of Arzaghi and Henderson (2008)—estimat-
ing higher β coefﬁcients for the closer spatial peers is evidence
for knowledge diffusion.
For the above reasons we feel that the most plausible confounds are
accounted for by our current research design. Still, a possible concern is
that, because thedesign does notmake explicit the source of variation in
peer ﬁrms' experience, it may be subject to some remaining—highly
spatially concentrated—omitted variable. In the next subsection we ad-
dress this concern by combining the current designwith plausibly exog-
enous variation in peer ﬁrms' experience due to ﬁrm moves. Although
that approach requires weaker identiﬁcation assumptions, it can only
be used to estimate spillovers in spatial networks. We therefore begin
the analysis with the current design to demonstrate that knowledge
spillovers about imports are present quite broadly across different
types of networks.
3.2.2. Results
Table 5 reports estimates of regression (1). In this and all subsequent
tables reporting regression results, coefﬁcients are measured in per-
centage points. To account for spatial correlation in the error term, in
all speciﬁcations we cluster standard errors by building.
Column 1 focuses on spatial spillovers. The estimated effect of hav-
ing a same-building peer with country-speciﬁc import experience is a
signiﬁcant 0.22. Intuitively, having a peer with experience importing
from a particular country, e.g., Slovakia, increases the probability that
the ﬁrm starts to import from that country by 0.22 percentage points.
For comparison, the baseline probability that a ﬁrm starts to import14 The reﬂection problem is less relevant for us because we focus on the effect of
peers'past import experience on the ﬁrm's import decision.
Table 5
Effect of peer experience on same-country imports.
Dependent variable: starting to import
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peers with import experience in:
Same building 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03)
Neighbor building 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02)
Cross-street building 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Person network 0.43*** 0.41***
(0.09) (0.09)
Ownership network 0.53*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.05)
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indica-
tors for speciﬁc types of peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience. Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read as
percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
15 We present descriptive statistics on moves in Table A4 of Appendix A.2.
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importing from a countrymore than doubles the probability of entering
that import market. Column 1 also reports that the estimated effect of
having a peer with country-speciﬁc import experience in a neighboring
building is a signiﬁcant 0.04. This is a ﬁfth as large as the same-building
effect, and shows that while spillovers to neighboring buildings are also
present, their intensity declines rapidly with distance. The cross-street
spillover effect is an even smaller and insigniﬁcant 0.03. This result
lends support to our identiﬁcation strategy: if a spatially correlated
omitted variable was driving our estimates, we would expect that vari-
able to also affect ﬁrms in buildings across the street. Taken together,
these estimates strongly support the presence of spatial spillovers in
importing.
Column 2 reports the analogous estimate for the person-connected
networks. Having a ﬁrm ofﬁcial who had prior experience importing
from a country increases the probability of importing by a signiﬁcant
0.43, or almost half a percentage point. This estimate is twice as large
as the same-building spillover effect. The larger magnitude seems
intuitive: same-building diffusion is likely to be more limited because
interactions between members of different ﬁrms are probably less
common and less intense. In contrast, for person-connected spillovers,
interactions are almost guaranteed since the manager now works for
the ﬁrm.
Column 3 shows the analogous estimates in the ownership-con-
nected network. Here we estimate an even larger coefﬁcient of
0.53. Importantly, this coefﬁcient cannot be interpreted as a knowl-
edge spillover because it is likely partly driven by a common owner
making sequential import decisions for her or his ﬁrms. Indeed, the
reason we include this speciﬁcation is to show that controlling for
the common ownership channel—which we do by excluding own-
ership-connected ﬁrms from the other networks—is important to
convincingly document knowledge spillovers in spatial and mana-
gerial networks.
Column 4 shows that combining all three types of networks in the
same speciﬁcation leaves the estimates essentially unchanged, indicat-
ing that the different networks represent genuinely different spillovers.
We conclude that there are signiﬁcant import spillovers in both spatial
and managerial networks. In Appendix A.1 we show that these results
are also robust to a range of speciﬁcation changes including various sub-
samples (Table A1, A3), additional controls for the ﬁrms' or its
peers'country-speciﬁc experiences (Table A1) and different measures
of connections (Table A2).3.3. Research design 2: peer moves
In our second research design we exploit a speciﬁc, plausibly exoge-
nous source of variation in peer knowledge, which is created by ﬁrm
moves. Focusing on the same-building spillover, we explore the effect
of a peer with particular import experience moving into the building
on a ﬁrm's subsequent import decision. This design has power because
moves are quite frequent, with N25% of the ﬁrms in our main sample
moving at least once.15 As it is unlikely that themoverwould internalize
the effect of its import experience on other ﬁrms in the buildingwhen it
chooses its location, we can plausibly assume that country-speciﬁc ex-
perience brought by the mover is an exogenous shock for the local
ﬁrms. Similarly, although the owner of the building might want to at-
tract good ﬁrms, it is less plausible that she would want to attract
ﬁrms with speciﬁc import experience.
We estimate the impact of moves using an event study, in which the
event is when a ﬁrm moves from another address into a building. The
sample consists of (i,c, t), that is, (ﬁrm, source country, year) observa-
tions where ﬁrm i is located in a building in some year twhich is subse-
quent to some other ﬁrm jmoving in the same building. The event is the
earliest date at which another ﬁrmmoves into the building of i. To limit
the confounding effects of preexisting neighbors, we restrict the sample
to observations in which no incumbent ﬁrm in the building had import
experience with the country c prior to the event.We do not require that
the mover ﬁrm j has import experience with the country c. Buildings
with movers having no import experience serve as controls.
Using this sample, we estimate the following regression equation:
Yict ¼
X5
τ¼1
βτ  Dτit  Xic þ
X5
τ¼1
γτ  Dτit þ αit þ μct þ εict : ð2Þ
Here Yict is an indicator for ﬁrm i having imported from country c in
some year up to and including t. Ditτ is an event-year indicator which
equals one if themover ﬁrm came to the building of i exactly τ years be-
fore t; and the τ=5 category also includes those observations in which
the move occurred N5 years ago. Xic is an indicator for the mover ﬁrm
having had import experience with country c by the time of the move.
As before, αit and μct denote ﬁrm-year and country-year ﬁxed effects
and εict denotes the error term.
In this speciﬁcation the coefﬁcients γτmeasure the baseline dynam-
ics of importing from a country c following a move by any ﬁrm. The co-
efﬁcients of interest are the βτ which measure the additional gains in
importing when the mover had prior experience with country c. Be-
cause of the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects, similarly to the previous research
design this regression is also identiﬁed from variation across source
countries. Because Yict indicates if the ﬁrm has ever imported from c
by t, and because the sample deﬁnition ensures that the i has not
imported from c before the mover's arrival, Yict effectively measures if
a ﬁrmwith no prior import experience starts to import from c in the pe-
riod between the arrival of the mover and t. Thus βτ captures the prob-
ability that the ﬁrm learns how to import by year τ, even if that ﬁrm
does not import in every subsequent year.
Fig. 1 presents visual evidence from the event study by plotting the
estimates of βτ together with their 95% conﬁdence intervals. Panel (a)
shows the results from the speciﬁcation without ﬁxed effects, while
Panel (b) from one that includes the full set of ﬁxed effects. Although
the point estimates in the second speciﬁcation are somewhat lower
and the standard errors wider because of the large increase in the num-
ber of controls, both speciﬁcations show the same basic pattern: a grad-
ual and eventually signiﬁcant increase in the probability of importing
from a country subsequent to a new neighbor with country-speciﬁc im-
port experiencemoving in. The fact that the increase is gradual is consis-
tent with the idea of knowledge diffusion.
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Fig. 1. Effect of experienced peermoving into building on same-country imports. Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs with theﬁrm located in a buildingwhere a newmover arrives,
andwhere noﬁrmhas imported from the country before, observed in years after themove. The solid lines show the estimateddifference in the number of importers τ years after themove
in buildings with movers having country-speciﬁc import experience vs with inexperienced movers. τ= 5 includes 5 or more years. The dashed lines show the 95% conﬁdence interval,
with standard errors clustered by building. Panel (a) shows estimates without ﬁxed effects and Panel (b) shows the same estimates including ﬁrm-year and country-year ﬁxed effects
in the regression.
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insigniﬁcantﬁrst-year effect of 0.12 percentage points increases to a sig-
niﬁcant 0.78 percentage points after four years.16 These estimates have
the same order of magnitude as the estimated same-building effect of
0.22 percentage points in research design 1, but highlight the impor-
tance of explicitly considering the dynamic response to moves. The pat-
tern revealed here serves as onemotivation for examining the dynamic
response of further import entries to a new entry in the counterfactual
analysis of Section 5 below, where we will also be able to compare ex-
plicitly the dynamics implied by research designs 1 and 2.
In summary, our research designs 1 and 2, exploiting different
sources of variation, different networks, aswell as a placebodesign, con-
sistently yield evidence in support of the presence and economic rele-
vance of the knowledge diffusion hypothesis. We conclude that
knowledge spillovers in spatial and managerial networks play an im-
portant role in shaping ﬁrms' import decisions.17 Coincidence with the overall baseline is due to many ﬁrms with missing data on
productivity.
18 The formula to calculate it is 1− e−δ×dist where δ is the estimated decay parameter
and dist denotes distance in meters.3.4. Benchmarking magnitudes
To get a better sense of themagnitude of the spillover effect here we
compare it to three sets of benchmarks. As our ﬁrst benchmark we use
export spillovers, the existence of which was documented by Mion
and Opromolla (2014), Fernandes and Tang (2014) and Kamal and
Sundaram (2016) among others. To make this comparison meaningful,
we use the same data and empirical approach for both types of spill-
overs: we employ our identiﬁcation strategy 1 to also estimate export
spillovers in Hungary. Table A6 in Appendix A.2 presents the results.
Both the patterns and themagnitudes are similar to our import spillover
results. For example, in the full model including other type of experi-
ence as well the same-building effect is 0.16 percentage points, the
neighbor-building effect is 0.04 percentage points and the managerial
peer effect is 0.37 percentage points. Relative to the baseline hazard of
starting to export, 0.21, these estimates correspond to an increase in ex-
port probability of 76%, 19% and 176%, while the analogous numbers for
the increase in import probability relative to its baseline of 0.19 are
116%, 21% and 216%. Export spillovers, like import spillovers, are also
highly concentrated in space. We conclude that diffusion of knowledge
about importing is about as strong as diffusion of knowledge about
exporting.16 We report the full set of coefﬁcients in Table A5 of Appendix A.2.As a second benchmark we ask what increase in ﬁrm productivity
would predict the increase in the probability of importing created by
knowledge spillovers. In our sample the probability of starting to import
from a country is 0.19% for not-yet-importer ﬁrms in the lowest produc-
tivity quartile,17 0.28% in the second quartile, 0.47% in the third quartile
and 0.58% in the highest quartile. Consequently, the estimated same-
building import spillover effect of 0.21 percentage points is comparable
to the predicted increase in the probability of starting to import as a ﬁrm
moves from the second to the third productivity quartile. This result fur-
ther conﬁrms the economic signiﬁcance of the estimated import spill-
over effect.
In our third benchmark we look not at the strength of the spillover
but at its speed of decay in space. In particular, we infer a parameter of
spatial decay that can be explicitly compared to similar decay parame-
ters in the literature. Our approach is to convert the same-building and
neighbor-building estimates of research design 1 to a distance-based
metric. We work with the decay function βij = k ⋅ e−δ⋅distij, where βij is
the estimated spillover from ﬁrm j to i, distij is the spatial distance be-
tween the two ﬁrms, and k and δ are parameters. In the 65% of the sam-
ple which we were able to geocode, we ﬁnd that the average distance
between two neighboring buildings is 28.1 m. Assuming that distance
is zero if two ﬁrms are in the same building, calibrating δ and k to the
speciﬁcation of column (4) in Table 5, we obtain δ=0.0579/m. This im-
plies that spillovers decline by 5.6% every meter.18 This value is some-
what higher than other estimates of within-city spatial decay. Indeed,
the estimates of Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) on networking beneﬁts
among advertising agencies in Manhattan imply a decay of 0.3% per
meter; those by Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) on housing externalities
in Richmond imply a decay of 0.2% per meter; and those by Ahlfeldt et
al. (2015) on production and residential externalities in Berlin imply de-
cays of 0.4% respectively 1% per meter.19 The main common feature of
these results and ours is that they all represent fairly strong decay:
knowledge spillovers appear to be highly spatially concentrated. And
the fact that our estimate is the highest suggests that in our context
building boundaries are important barriers to diffusion. Our decay19 To calculate these decay parameters, we use column 3 of Table 4 in Arzaghi and Hen-
derson (2008), the estimate on page 524 in Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010), and column 1 of
Table V in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015).
Table 6
Heterogeneity of peer effect by ﬁrm characteristics.
Dependent variable: starting to import Firm groups by
Size Productivity Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Same-building importer peer 0.07*** 0.03 0.11***
* Group 1 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Same-building importer peer 0.62***° 0.20***° 0.81***°
* Group 2 (0.12) (0.05) (0.11)
Same-building importer peer 1.45***° 0.38***
* Group 3 (0.29) (0.07)
Same-building importer peer 3.32***° 0.61***°
* Group 4 (0.87) (0.09)
Other types of importing peers Yes Yes Yes
* Group indicators
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indica-
tors for peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience interactedwith group indica-
tors. Groups are deﬁned in columns, with group 1 the lowest category or domestic ﬁrms in
column 3. Other types of peers refer to all other (non-same-building) peer categories in
Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multi-
plied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b
0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
#
denotes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from
that of previous group at 5%.
Table 7
Heterogeneity of peer effect by peer characteristics.
Dependent variable: starting to import Peer groups by
Size Productivity Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Peers with import experience in:
same building and in group 1 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
same building and in group 2 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.40***
#
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
same building and in group 3 0.35*** 0.19***
(0.07) (0.04)
same building and in group 4 0.15 0.34***
#
(0.10) (0.05)
Other types of importing peers in different
groups
Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indica-
tors for peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience by peer group. Groups are de-
ﬁned in columns, with group 1 the lowest category or domestic ﬁrms in column 3. Other
types of peers refer to all other (non-same-building) peer categories in Table 3. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read
as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
#
denotes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from that of previous group at 5%.
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models that feature knowledge diffusion of business practices such as
importing.
4. Heterogeneity and mechanisms
In this section we investigate the heterogeneity of import spillovers
by ﬁrm and peer characteristics. We focus on same-building spillovers
because these were the strongest and most cleanly identiﬁed. We ﬁrst
explore heterogeneous effects separately by ﬁrm and peer characteris-
tics, and then investigate how the interaction between these character-
istics inﬂuences the strength of diffusion. This analysis yields lessons
about the mechanism of spillovers, highlighting the potential beneﬁts
of clusters and targeted policies, which we then quantitatively evaluate
in the counterfactual analysis of Section 5.20
4.1. Strength of diffusion by ﬁrm and peer characteristics
4.1.1. Firm heterogeneity
We estimate heterogeneous effects by ﬁrm characteristics using the
following regression, which is a modiﬁcation of research design 1:
Yict ¼
XH
h¼1
βh  Xsbic;t−1  Ihit þ controlsict þ αit þ μct þ εict : ð3Þ
Here h indexes ﬁrm categories by a characteristic, such as productiv-
ity quartiles; and Iith is an indicatorwhich equals one ifﬁrm i in period t is
in the particular category h, such as the highest productivity quartile.
The variable Xsb is an indicator for peers' import experience in the
same building. Accordingly, the coefﬁcients βhmeasure the effect of ex-
perienced same-building peers for ﬁrms in category h. For complete-
ness, the controls include the analogous interactions of the category
indicators with import experience in the four other networks (neighbor
building, cross-street building, managerial and owner network).21 As20 Table O4 of the Online Appendix presents the relative size and the share of imports by
ﬁrm groups used for the heterogeneity estimates. In Section O2.1 (Tables O5-O7) of the
Online Appendix we include the corresponding heterogeneity results for spillovers in
other networks.
21 Omitting these controls has small effects on the reported results.usual, αit and μct denote ﬁrm-year and country-year ﬁxed effects and
εict denotes the error term.
Table 6 reports the results from estimating heterogeneous effects by
ﬁrm size, productivity and ownership. Column 1 focuses on size mea-
sured as employment, and categorizes ﬁrms into four groups. Group 1
includes those ﬁrms with at most 5 employees, group 2 those with 6–
20 employees, group 3 those with 21–100 employees and group 4 in-
cludes ﬁrms with N100 employees.22 The coefﬁcient of 0.07 percentage
points shows signiﬁcant spillover effects for the smallest ﬁrms in group
1. The subsequent coefﬁcients imply that the spillover effects for larger
ﬁrms are larger than those for ﬁrms in group 1, and are increasing in the
ﬁrm's size category. t-tests show that the difference between the esti-
mated coefﬁcients of subsequent groups is signiﬁcant at 5% in each
case (denoted by
#
in the table). Larger ﬁrms are more likely to respond
to import knowledge in their building.
Column 2 reports heterogeneous effects by ﬁrm productivity quar-
tile, deﬁned using our TFP estimates introduced in Section 2. Here we
ﬁnd no spillovers for the least productive ﬁrms in group 1, but signiﬁ-
cant and increasingly strong spillovers in the higher productivity quar-
tiles. The coefﬁcients of subsequent groups are signiﬁcantly different
in two of the three cases. Finally, in column 3 we look at ownership:
group 1 represents domestically-owned ﬁrms and ﬁrms without infor-
mation on ownership, while group 2 represents foreign-owned ﬁrms.
Spillovers are signiﬁcant in both groups and signiﬁcantly larger for for-
eign ﬁrms. Taken together, these results suggest that absorptive capac-
ity (Lychagin, 2016), which is more likely to be present in larger, more
productive, and foreign ﬁrms, is important for the adoption of import
knowledge.
4.1.2. Peer heterogeneity
To estimate heterogeneous effects by peer type, we use
Yict ¼
XH
h¼1
βh  Xsbic;t−1 hð Þ þ controlsict þ αit þ μct þ εict: ð4Þ22 In all three columns we assign ﬁrms for which we lack information about the charac-
teristic to group 1. The estimated patterns are robust to putting these ﬁrms into a separate
group.
Table 8
Effect of peer import experience by number of peers.
Dependent variable: starting to import
(1) (2)
Peers with import experience in same building:
Number of peers 0.20***
(0.03)
peer 0.17***
(0.03)
2 peers 0.36***°
(0.06)
3 peers 0.82***°
(0.14)
4 or more peers 1.02***
(0.21)
Number of peers of other types Yes No
Indicators for the number of peers of other types No Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are the
number of peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience in column (1) and indica-
tors for a speciﬁc number of such peers in column (2). Other types of peers refer to all
other (non-same-building) peer categories in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point
marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. ° denotes that the co-
efﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from that of previous group at 5%.
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Xsbic, t−1(h) is an indicator for having a same-building peer in category
h which has import experience. Thus βh measures the effect of having
an experienced peer in category h. Similar to Eq. (3) the controls include
the analogous variables for the other networks.
Table 7 reports the results. Column 1 shows spillovers by peer size,
using the same cutoffs of 5, 20 and 100 employees already used
above.23 Spillovers are signiﬁcant even from peers in the smallest
group. Although the differences are not signiﬁcant at 5%, the point
estimates show that spillovers are larger when peers are larger, except
for peers in the highest quartile where the coefﬁcient is imprecisely
estimated. Column 2 shows the analogous speciﬁcation using peers'
productivity quartiles. Here too, spillovers are always positive, and
point estimates are larger for higher productivity peers. The difference
between the third and fourth quartile is signiﬁcant. Finally, column 3
shows signiﬁcant spillovers from domestic peers (group 1) and signiﬁ-
cantly larger spillovers from foreign peers (group 2). Although the
coefﬁcients in this table are slightly less precisely estimated, their gen-
eral pattern strongly suggests that the import knowledge of larger,
more productive and foreignﬁrms—perhaps because they aremore suc-
cessful importers ormore trusted peers—ismore likely to diffuse. To fur-
ther conﬁrm this logic, in Table A7 of Appendix A.3 we show that
spillovers are stronger from “more successful” importer peers, where
import success is measured with the persistence of the peer's import
experience.
4.1.3. Number of peers
We next explore whether having more peers with country-speciﬁc
import experience increases the probability of importing. Simple
models of diffusionwould predict such an effect, aswithmore informed
peers there are more opportunities for learning. We consider a speciﬁ-
cation in which the effect is linear and use the number of peers with
country-speciﬁc experience as a right-hand side variable. Column 1 of
Table 8 shows that increasing the number of experienced peers in the
same building by one increases the average probability of import
entry by 0.2 percentage points. Column 2 presents similar results from
a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation in which we separately estimate the effect
of having exactly k experienced peers in a speciﬁc peer group. These co-
efﬁcients are comparable in magnitude to the 0.2 effect of the linear
speciﬁcation, and given the standard errors we cannot reject that in
this range the number of experienced peers linearly increases the prob-
ability of importing.
Taken together, the above results reveal plausible heterogeneity in
knowledge spillovers: diffusion is stronger when ﬁrms are better,
when peers are better, when the quality of knowledge is higher, and
when there are more learning opportunities.
4.2. Interaction between ﬁrm and peer characteristics
We turn to explore how ﬁrm and peer characteristics interact in
shaping diffusion. Interaction effects are potentially important because
their presence indicates that sorting ﬁrms can further increase the
adoption of good business practices.
4.2.1. Productivity complementarities
We explore complementarities between ﬁrm and peer productivity
using the following speciﬁcation
Yict ¼ βll  Xsbic;t−1 þ βhl  Xsbic;t−1  Ihit þ βlh  Xsbic;t−1 hð Þ þ βhh  Xsbic;t−1 hð Þ
 Ihit þ controlsict þ αit þ μct þ εict : ð5Þ23 As before, we assign peers for whichwe lack information on the speciﬁc characteristic
to peer group 1.For simplicitywe just use binary indicators to proxy for productivity,
let h stand for high-productivity and l for low-productivity ﬁrms, and let
Iit
h be an indicator for ﬁrm i in year t being in the high-productivity
category.24 Since Xsbic, t−1 is an indicator for import experience by
(any) peer while Xsbic, t−1(h) is an indicator for import experience by a
high-productivity peer, βll measures the spillover to a low-productivity
ﬁrm from a low-productivity peer, βhl and βlh capture the additional
gains in the spillover for high-productivity ﬁrms and peers, respectively.
And βhh measures the complementarity effect of interest.
Table 9 shows the results from estimating this regression. Column 1
reports a speciﬁcation in which high productivity is deﬁned as the top
quartile in the productivity distribution. The fact that the coefﬁcients
of the non-interacted indicators of high-productivity ﬁrm (βhl) and
high-productivity peer (βlh) are positive and signiﬁcant is familiar
from the previous subsection. The key novelty in the speciﬁcation is
that the coefﬁcient of the interaction between high-productivity ﬁrm
and high-productivity peer is a signiﬁcant 0.5 percentage points. In col-
umn 2 we change the deﬁnition of the indicator for high-productivity
ﬁrm to be above the median of the productivity distribution. The pat-
terns obtained here are similar, and in particular the coefﬁcient of the
interaction continues to be signiﬁcant and positive. From these results
we conclude that there are statistically and economically signiﬁcant
complementarities between ﬁrm and peer productivity for the adoption
of good business practices.
One implication of these results concerns the beneﬁts of sorting. Be-
cause of positive complementarities, sorting ﬁrms by productivity can
generate aggregate gains in the overall adoption of good business prac-
tices. This force is distinct from thebasic idea that havingmore informed
peers increases adoption: it suggests that even holding ﬁxed the aver-
age number of informed peers—that is, the neighborhood structure—
changing the pattern of sorting can further increase adoption.
We next present a speciﬁcation that captures the distinct effects of
(i) the number of informed peers and (ii) the quality of the match.
This speciﬁcation will form the basis of our counterfactual analysis in
Section 5 in which we quantify the joint implications of these two24 We assign ﬁrms with missing productivity data to the low-productivity group.
Table 9
Complementarities between peer and receiver ﬁrm productivity.
Dependent variable: starting to import High-productivity
deﬁned as
Top
quartile
Above
median
(1) (2)
Peers with import experience in same building if:
0.10*** 0.04
Any peer (0.03) (0.03)
Any peer 0.29*** 0.17**
* High-productivity ﬁrm (0.10) (0.08)
0.13*** 0.05
High-productivity peer (0.05) (0.04)
High-productivity peer 0.50*** 0.40***
* High-productivity ﬁrm (0.18) (0.11)
Other types of importing peers by ﬁrm and peer
productivity
Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indica-
tors for peerswith prior country-speciﬁc import experience separately for high-productiv-
ity peers and also interacted with high-productivity ﬁrm indicator. We deﬁne high-
productivity as a 3-year average TFP above the 75th percentile of the 2-digit industry in
column (1) and above the 50th percentile in column (2). Other types of peers refer to all
other (non-same-building) peer categories in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point
marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Table 10
Complementarities between peer and receiver ﬁrm productivity with peer effect increas-
ing in the number of peers.
Dependent variable: starting to import
(1)
Number of peers with import experience in same building if:
low-productivity peer 0.12**
* Low-productivity ﬁrm (0.05)
high-productivity peer 0.16***
* Low-productivity ﬁrm (0.04)
low-productivity peer 0.31***
#
* High-productivity ﬁrm (0.07)
high-productivity peer 0.73***
#
* High-productivity ﬁrm (0.13)
Number of peers of other types by ﬁrm and peer productivity Yes
Firm-year FE Yes
Country-year FE Yes
Observations 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are the
number of peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience by productivity and
interactedwith receiver ﬁrm productivity indicators. We deﬁne high-productivity as hav-
ing a 3-year average TFP above the 75th percentile of the 2-digit industry. Other types of
peers refer to all other (non-same-building) peer categories in Table 3. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients aremultiplied by 100 to read as per-
centage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
#
denotes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from that of previous group at 5%.
25 In Table O8 of theOnline Appendixwe also explore a related speciﬁcation inwhichwe
show that conditional on a ﬁrm starting to import from a country, it is more likely to im-
port the product category in which its peer has had import experience.
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Yict ¼ βll  Nsbic;t−1 lð Þ  Ilit þ βhl  Nsbic;t−1 lð Þ  Ihit
þ βlh  Nsbic;t−1 hð Þ  Ilit þ βhh  Nsbic;t−1 hð Þ  Ihit þ controlsict þ αit þ μct þ εict
ð6Þ
whereN(l) is the number of low-productivity andN(h) is the number of
high-productivity peers, Iitl is an indicator for ﬁrm i in year t being
in the low-productivity category, and controls include the analogous in-
teractions for the other four peer groups.
Table 10 shows the results, using the top productivity quartile for the
deﬁnition of high-productivity ﬁrms. The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cients show that spillovers are positive for any ﬁrm type and peer type,
so that having more knowledgeable peers increases the probability of
importing. And the fact that βhh is much larger than the other coefﬁ-
cients shows the complementarity effect: diffusion is stronger when
both the ﬁrm and the peers are more productive.
4.2.2. Same-industry and same-product effects
To further explore the nature of complementarities, we investigate
whether spillovers are larger between same-industry ﬁrms, and within
a given imported product category. For same-industry effects our strat-
egy is to include separate indicators for experienced peers operating in
the same2-digit industry as the observedﬁrmand operating in different
industries. We do this for all networks, but only report the results here
for the same-building network. Column 1 of Table 11 shows that
same-building peers have a larger effect if they operate in the same in-
dustry as the ﬁrm. Relative to the signiﬁcant different-industry spillover
of 0.17 percentage points, the same-industry spillover is larger by 0.42
percentage points. Column 2 shows a similar pattern for the restricted
sample of manufacturing ﬁrms, but perhaps due to the reduction in
power the difference between the effect of the two peer types is not sig-
niﬁcant any more. The positive and signiﬁcant cross-industry spillovers
mitigate identiﬁcation concerns related to clustering by industry. And
the larger same-industry spillovers highlight the societal beneﬁt ofsorting ﬁrms based on industry for increasing the overall adoption
rate of good business practices.
Finally, to measure import diffusion within a product category, we
modify our speciﬁcation in twoways. First,we estimate separate regres-
sions for each product category, using a sample of observations inwhich
the ﬁrm has not yet imported the given product category from a speciﬁc
country, and including as controls indicators for whether the ﬁrm has
imported other product categories from that country before. Second,
our right-hand side variables are indicators for “same-product importer
peers”—that is, peerswhich have imported in the past the given product
category from the speciﬁc country—and “different-product importer
peers”—that is, peers which have only imported in the past different
product categories from the speciﬁc country. The last four columns of
Table 11 show the results for each of four product categories deﬁned
based on the BEC categories. The effect of different-product importer
peers is signiﬁcant in all four categories; and same-product spillovers
are always higher, signiﬁcantly so in three of the four cases. We con-
clude that spillovers are larger within a product category, which is intu-
itive if part of importing knowledge is product-speciﬁc and further
strengthens the argument about sorting ﬁrms based on industry to
maximize spillovers.25
5. Counterfactual policy analysis
In the presence of spillovers, policies that encourage ﬁrm trade can
have additional indirect effects through a social multiplier (Glaeser
et al., 2003). And when spillover effects are context-dependent, so is the
size of the multiplier, opening the possibility that targeted trade policies
generate larger social gains. In this sectionweuse our estimates of the im-
port spillover effect in a counterfactual analysis to explore how the size
and composition of a ﬁrm's peer group shape the social multiplier.
Our goal is to compute the model-implied effect on the number of
importers of a non-importer ﬁrm's exogenously induced entry into
importing. To do this we assume that import spillovers follow a simple
diffusionmodelwhose parameters are determined byour estimates. For
simplicity, in the model we only allow import spillovers between peers
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Fig. 2.Distribution of the 5-year social multiplier for ﬁrms with non-importer peers in the
building. Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in which the ﬁrm and at least one
other ﬁrm in the building have not yet imported from the country in 2003. The 5-year
social multiplier is the additional number of ﬁrms in the building starting to import
from a speciﬁc country within 5 years after one ﬁrm in the building is induced to start
importing form the country, normalized by the same difference in the absence of
spillovers. For the calculations we assume that import spillovers and the baseline
probability of starting to import are constant over time and across countries, but
heterogeneous across ﬁrm and peer productivity groups; spillovers exist only within the
same building, and increase linearly in the number of peers; and there are no ﬁrm
entries, exits or location changes.
Table 11
Effect of peer experience within industry and product.
same industry same product
Dependent variable: starting to import All ﬁrms Manuf. ﬁrms Consumer goods Industrial supplies Capital goods Parts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peers with import experience in:
same building with different industry/product 0.17*** 0.36*** 0.07*** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
same building with same industry/product 0.59***
#
1.00** 0.17***
#
0.17***
#
0.11*** 0.18***
#
(0.09) (0.44) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Other types of importing peers by same/different industry/product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Not yet importer from country No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 376,739 3,821,755 3,805,958 3,828,759 3,829,629
Baseline hazard (in %): 0.19 0.41 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.05
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported from the country by the previous year. Column (2) contains onlymanufacturing ﬁrms. Dependent
variable is an indicator for theﬁrmstarting to import from the country in the given year. In columns (3)–(6) only imports in the given product category are considered, both for creating the
sample and deﬁning the dependent variable. Right-hand side variables are indicators for peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience. Separate indicators are included for peers in
the 2-digit industry of theﬁrmor in a different industry in columns (1)–(2), and peers importing the same or different product categories in columns (3)–(6). Consumer goods are BEC 1 &
6, industrial supplies are BEC 2 & 3, capital goods are BEC 41, 51& 52, and parts and accessories are BEC 42 & 53. Other types of peers refer to all other (non-same-building) peer categories
in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b
0.05, * p b 0.1.
#
denotes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from that of previous group at 5%. Baseline hazard refers to the share of importers in the estimation sample.
253M. Bisztray et al. / Journal of International Economics 115 (2018) 242–258in the same building. We assume that the probability that a non-im-
porter gets “infected” is linear in the number of importing peers.26 We
allow the diffusion probability to depend on both the sender and the re-
ceiver ﬁrm's productivity type, measured with an indicator which
equals one if the ﬁrm is in the highest productivity quartile. We also
allow ﬁrms to become importers independently of spillovers, with a
baseline probability which is constant over time and across source
countries, but can depend on the ﬁrm's productivity type. We assume
that all spillover and baseline adoption realizations are independent
from each other and over time. Given these assumptions, the model
generates a Markov process, and we can track its dynamics, for each
building, with four state variables: the number of high/low productivity
importer/non-importer ﬁrms in the building.27
To parametrize this model we use speciﬁcation (6) in Table 10,
which estimates different spillover parameters by ﬁrm and peer pro-
ductivity category, and also reports the change in spillovers by the num-
ber of experienced peers. We calculate baseline probabilities by ﬁrm
productivity category using the subgroup of ﬁrms which have no expe-
rienced peers in the same building. Starting from an initial year swhich
we set to 2003, we then study dynamics in the diffusion model in each
building over a ﬁve-year horizon. In doing this, we assume that ﬁrms do
not move in or out of the building and do not enter or exit production.
We also investigate the benchmark case of themodel with no spillovers,
in which the diffusion parameters are set to zero.
5.1. The social multiplier
A key object of interest is the 5-year social multiplier of importing
that results from exogenously inducing a ﬁrm i to import from country
c, deﬁned for each ﬁrm iwhich has not started to import from country c
as
ηcs ið Þ ≡
E Mca ið Þ;sþ5jTcs ið Þ ¼ 1; spillovers
h i
−E Mca ið Þ;sþ5jTcs ið Þ ¼ 0; spillovers
h i
E Mca ið Þ;sþ5jTcs ið Þ ¼ 1;no spillovers
h i
−E Mca ið Þ;sþ5jTcs ið Þ ¼ 0;no spillovers
h i :
ð7Þ
HereMca(i), s+5 is the number of importers from country c on address
a of ﬁrm i in year s+5 and Tsc(i) refers to the “treatment status” of ﬁrm i26 This assumption is consistent with the results of the ﬂexible speciﬁcation reported in
column (2) of Table 8.
27 Wepresent the transitionmatrix and the forecasting equations of thisMarkov chain in
Appendix B.in year s, taking the value 1 if thisﬁrm is induced to start importing from
country c. The numerator shows the expected change in the number of
importers after 5 years of ﬁrm i being treated. This term incorporates
import spillovers. The denominator is the corresponding treatment ef-
fect in the benchmark model in which import spillovers are set at
zero. Thus themultipliermeasures howmuch larger is the treatment ef-
fect in the presence, relative to the absence, of import spillovers.28
Fig. 2 plots, in increasing order, the implied 5-year social multiplier
for all non-importer ﬁrms that have non-importer peers in our data in
s = 2003. The ﬁgure reveals substantial heterogeneity. Interestingly,
for about half a percent of ﬁrms the multiplier is smaller than one:
treating these ﬁrms results in a smaller number of total importers in28 The conditional expectations can be calculated by iterating theMarkov chain forward,
as we explain in Appendix B.
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cause spillovers have two effects: they increase the impact of treating
ﬁrm i, but they also increase spillovers from other importers in the
building. Because of this second force, the net effect of treating ﬁrm i
can be reduced when spillovers are introduced, essentially because
spillovers from peers of i crowd out spillovers from i. However this sub-
tle crowding-out effect only overcomes the more intuitive positive ef-
fect for a small share of observations.
Themedianmultiplier in the ﬁgure is 1.03: inducing themedianﬁrm
to import is 3%more effective in the presence than in the absence of im-
port spillovers. The 90th percentile of themultiplier is 1.13. Thus induc-
ing a ﬁrm to import which is located at this point of the multiplier
distribution is 13% more effective once import spillovers are taken into
account. While spillovers may not be very important for the typical
ﬁrm, they seem quite important for a signiﬁcant share of ﬁrms, suggest-
ing that targeting policies to such ﬁrms can generate substantial
beneﬁts.
5.2. Targeted trade policies
We next use our counterfactual to evaluate a hypothetical import-
encouraging trade policy, which demonstrates how targeting can im-
prove policy effectiveness. For policy evaluation the object of interest
is not the multiplier, but rather the numerator of Eq. (7), which mea-
sures the ﬁve-year treatment effect of inducing ﬁrm i to import from
country c. In our analysis we compare two policies: one inwhichwe tar-
get ﬁrms for which this treatment effect is large, and another with no
targeting. For simplicity we consider an import-encouragement treat-
ment which is completely effective in teaching the ﬁrm how to import
from a particular country. Thus we assume that treating a ﬁrm results
in it starting to import from the country under consideration with
certainty.
Our targeted policy is to treat the 1000 ﬁrms for whom the esti-
mated treatment effect is largest, while our non-targeted policy is to
treat 1000 randomly chosen ﬁrms. To avoid complications arising
from treating multiple ﬁrms in the same building, we restrict both pol-
icies to treat, for any given source country, atmost oneﬁrmper building.
And to induce some amount of diffusionwe only treat ﬁrmswhich have
not yet imported from the country and which have at least one other
non-importer peer in the building. Evaluating the targeted policy is
straightforward, as it requires computing the numerator of (7) for the
selected ﬁrms. For the non-targeted policy the impact also depends on
the speciﬁc set of ﬁrms treated. To measure its average effect, we
draw the 1000 random ﬁrms 1000 times, compute the treatment effect
for each draw, and average over draws.
The differences between the impacts of the two policies are remark-
able. The targeted policy yields after ﬁve years 285 additional importers
for a total of 1285 importers. In contrast, the non-targeted policy yields,
on average, 16 additional importers. In this example the targeted policy
is 26% more effective than the non-targeted policy (1,285/1,016− 1 =
0.26). Since the targeting is based entirely on observable ﬁrm character-
istics such as the productivity of the treated ﬁrm and its peers in the
building, in principle it can be implemented using public data. Overall,
the result suggests that there can be large potential gains from targeting
interventions to ﬁrms which are likely to be good seeds for diffusion.
5.3. Internal consistency
We now connect the simulation results of the diffusion model and
the estimates of the mover design in Section 3.3. Both of these designs
evaluate the dynamic impact of having an additional importer peer. Be-
cause they exploit different sources of variation and use a different com-
bination of reduced-form and structural approaches, their comparison
provides a useful test of internal consistency. As we have just seen, the
counterfactual implies that turning 1000 random ﬁrms in different
buildings with non-importer ﬁrms into importers would result in anexpected 16 additional importers after 5 years. The point estimate of
the mover design implies (Table A5) that ﬁve years after an importer
moves into the building, the probability of an incumbent starting to im-
port increases by 0.73 percentage points. Because the average number
of incumbent ﬁrms in a building is 4.6, the latter estimate implies that
turning 1000 ﬁrms in different “non-importer” buildings into importers
would result in 0.0073 ⋅ (4.6− 1) ⋅ 1000 = 26.28 new importers. This
has the same order of magnitude as the counterfactual, and given our
standard errors we cannot reject that the two are equal.
We can also check intervening years. Table O9 in the Online Appen-
dix reports the expected number of ﬁrms starting to import 1–4 years
after the above treatment in both designs. Here too, the numbers have
the same order ofmagnitude and given the conﬁdence intervalswe can-
not reject that they are equal. These patterns are especially remarkable
because the mover and the counterfactual design use somewhat differ-
ent samples: for example, in themover design the 5-year effect is iden-
tiﬁed from moves in the subperiod 1994–1998. We conclude that
exploiting different designs and sources of variation lead to similar esti-
mates of the dynamics of knowledge spillovers, providing internal con-
sistency to our results.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we documented evidence for import spillovers.
Exploiting source-country variation, precise spatial neighborhoods and
plausibly exogenous ﬁrm moves in two complementary research de-
signs, we obtained credible estimates of diffusion in spatial and mana-
gerial networks. We also documented that spillovers are stronger
when ﬁrms or peers are better, and exhibit complementarities in ﬁrm
and peer productivity. Taken together, these two results show that
both high network density, and positive sorting in a given network,
can increase diffusion. We then conducted a counterfactual analysis
showing that due to the combination of these two forces the social mul-
tiplier of importing is heterogeneous, so that targeted import subsidy
policies can have substantially larger effects. In combination, our results
highlighted one concrete beneﬁt of ﬁrm clusters: that of facilitating the
diffusion of good business practices. More broadly, our analysis contrib-
utes to a growing literature highlighting the importance of business net-
works in shaping economic outcomes.
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Table A2
Peer effects with different deﬁnitions of person network.
Dependent variable: starting to import
Connecting person deﬁnition
any connection from signing right to
ownership
Type of other experience: Exporter Owner Exporter Owner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peers with import experience in:
same building 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
neighbor building 0.04* 0.04** 0.04* 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cross-street building 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
person network 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.08 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
ownership network 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Peers with other experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indica-
tors for speciﬁc types of peerswith prior country-speciﬁc import experience, as well as ex-
port experience in columns (1),(3) or country-speciﬁc owners in columns (2),(4). As
connecting people columns (1)–(2) use managers with signing right, owners or supervi-
sory board members, and columns (3)–(4) use owners of the ﬁrm who had signing
right in the peer before. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁ-
cients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance
levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
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Appendix A. Additional Evidence
A.1. Alternative speciﬁcations and robustness
Early import history. Since we do not observe the import history of
ﬁrms before 1992, in our empirical designs such as that in 3.2 we may
misclassify some ﬁrms which imported earlier than 1992 as non-im-
porters. To address this problem, we re-estimate our baseline speciﬁca-
tion (1) for the sub-period 1999–2003, which ensures that a ﬁrm we
classify as a non-importer in a year did not import in the preceding six
years. Column (1) of Table A1 shows that this sample restriction gives
signiﬁcant peer effects and qualitatively similar results.
Firm's other country-speciﬁc experience.A ﬁrm's decision to import
from a country may be correlated with its other country-speciﬁc expe-
rience, such as exporting to that country or having owners from that
country. Column (2) of Table A1 re-estimates our baseline speciﬁcation
(1) controlling for these experiences. Both of these experiences predict
the decision to import, but our estimate of the spillover coefﬁcient re-
mains essentially unchanged.
Peers'country-speciﬁc experience. We next explore whether having
peers who have export experience with a country (column 3), or who
have been owned by entities from a country (column 4) also affects a
ﬁrm's decision to import. If importing from country c requires knowl-
edge speciﬁc only to country c, then we expect similar coefﬁcients for
these cross-activity spillover effects; but if importing also requires
knowledge speciﬁc to the activity of importing then these estimates
should be smaller. The results seem more consistent with the second
hypothesis: although peers' export and ownership experience do pre-
dict to some extent the decision to import, the coefﬁcients (not re-
ported) are generally smaller and less signiﬁcant, and the import
spillover coefﬁcients stay unchanged.Table A1
Effect of peer experience on same-country imports.
Dependent variable: starting to import
Sample period:
1999–2003 1994–2003
Type of other experience:
Exporter Owner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peers with import experience in:
same building 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
neighbor building 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cross-street building 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
person network 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
ownership network 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm exported to the country 2.01***
(0.11)
Firm had owners from the
country
0.64***
(0.08)
Peers with other experience No No Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,385,154 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Column (1) includes a shorter sample period:
1999–2003. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm starting to import from the
country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for speciﬁc types of
peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience, as well as export experience in col-
umn (3) and country-speciﬁc owners in column (4). Column (2) includes additional indi-
cators for the ﬁrm's own country-speciﬁc export experience and for the presence of
owners from the same country. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building.
Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁ-
cance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.Connecting person deﬁnition.We next explore the robustness of the
results in Section 3.2 to different deﬁnitions of the person network.
For completeness we work with speciﬁcations similar to those in col-
umns 3 and 4 of Table A1 that, besides import, also include other
types of peer experience. Table A2 reports the results. In columns 1
and 2 we use a broader deﬁnition than that in the main text: we relax
the requirement that the connecting person needs to have signing
rights, and allow her/him to have any kind of measurable connection
to both ﬁrms. Thus, in this deﬁnition a person p is connected to a ﬁrm
A if (i) p has signing rights in A; or (ii) p is an owner of A; or (iii) p is
member of the supervisory board of A. We then use this deﬁnition to
create our broader measure of ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm connections by deﬁning B
to be a peer of A at t if there is a person connected to A at twhowas con-
nected to B at some prior date. Like in the main text, we exclude peers
who are in the same ownership networks, which here implies in partic-
ular that we eliminate those connections where the connecting person
was an owner in both ﬁrms.
In columns 3 and 4 we use a narrower deﬁnition than the one in the
main text. Here, the connecting person must be both an owner of A at t
andmust have had signing rights in B at a prior date. A potential beneﬁt
of this speciﬁcation is that it reduces the problem of reverse causality
emerging ifﬁrmspurposefully hiremanagerswith speciﬁc import expe-
rience: it seems less likely that ﬁrms purposefully recruit owners with
speciﬁc import experience.
Table A2 shows that all our results are robust to using the broad def-
inition. However, with the narrow deﬁnition the coefﬁcient of person-
connected peers remains positive but becomes insigniﬁcant. This
could be because the reverse causality effect was driving our main esti-
mates, but could also be explained by using a too restrictive measure of
person-connections. The other coefﬁcients in these regressions are as
expected, showing that the effect of experienced peers in the other
peer groups is not sensitive to changes in the deﬁnition of person-con-
nected peers.
Table A3
Peer effects with different sample deﬁnitions.
Dependent variable: importing
All ﬁrms First ever importers Not yet importers
Type of other experience: Exporter Owner Exporter Owner Exporter Owner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peers with import experience in:
Same building 0.78*** 0.78*** 9.12*** 9.03*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.08) (0.08) (1.84) (1.84) (0.02) (0.02)
Neighbor building 0.08 0.08 1.39 2.20 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (2.35) (2.33) (0.02) (0.02)
Cross-street building 0.18** 0.17** 0.46 0.10 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (2.68) (2.69) (0.02) (0.02)
Person network 1.77*** 1.77*** 10.40*** 11.70*** 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.26) (0.26) (3.82) (3.73) (0.09) (0.09)
Ownership network 2.14*** 2.21*** 21.90*** 23.00*** 0.43*** 0.44***
(0.15) (0.15) (2.69) (2.67) (0.05) (0.05)
Peers with other experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,845,272 3,845,272 23,404 23,404 3,663,512 3,663,512
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in all years in columns (1)–(2); in the yearwhen theﬁrmstarted to import from the country group for theﬁrst time in columns (3)–(4); in those
yearswhen the ﬁrm has not imported from any of the countries by the previous year in columns (5)–(6). Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm importing from the country in the
given year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for speciﬁc types of peerswith prior country-speciﬁc import experience, aswell as export experience in columns (1),(3),(5) or country-
speciﬁc owners in columns (2),(4),(6). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered bybuilding. Coefﬁcients aremultiplied by 100 to read as percentage pointmarginal effects. Signiﬁcance
levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Table A5
Effect of experienced peer moving into building on same-country imports.
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timate the effect of experienced peers on the decision to start importing.
To do this we use a sample in which, at every observation, the ﬁrm has
not yet imported from the particular country until the previous year. In
Table A3 we consider different sample deﬁnitions, which allows us to
answer slightly different questions. For completeness, we estimate re-
gressions analogous to those in columns 3 and 4 of Table A1which con-
trol for both the import and other possible experience of peer ﬁrms. In
columns (1) and (2) we include all ﬁrm-country pairs in all years.
These speciﬁcations answer the question of whether a ﬁrm imports
from a country in a year with a higher probability if it has peers with
country-speciﬁc experience, irrespective of the ﬁrm's own import expe-
rience. Columns (3) and (4) include each ﬁrm only in the single year in
which it starts to import from the group of the four countries for theﬁrst
time, with a separate observation for each of the four countries. This
speciﬁcation asks whether—conditional on starting to import from one
of the four countries—the ﬁrm ismore likely to import from the country
with which some of its peers have experience. Columns (5) and (6) areTable A4
Descriptive statistics for buildings with new ﬁrms moving in.
Number of
incumbent
ﬁrms
addresses of
incumbents
incumbent
ﬁrms
addresses of
incumbents
on all addresses on addresses without import
experience
Total 211,453 76,433 184,978 66,596
With a mover 105,214 19,976 87,754 16,833
With a mover having previous import experience from
any of the 4
countries
18,163 2251 8951 1478
the Czech
Republic
11,362 1255 3415 645
Slovakia 8907 1036 3231 598
Romania 6696 749 3124 475
Russia 4798 563 2462 352
Notes:Wedeﬁne incumbents asﬁrms staying in the same building as in the previous year.
A mover is a ﬁrm changing its address within Budapest from one year to another. An ad-
dress has no import experiencewith a country if no incumbent ﬁrm in that or in neighbor-
ing buildings has imported from the country up to that year. Themovermight ormight not
have import experience.the closest to our baseline speciﬁcation, but these speciﬁcations exclude
entirely those ﬁrms which have already imported from one of the four
countries. In all these speciﬁcations, the patterns are consistent with
the spillover hypothesis. In particular, the import experience of same-
building neighbors and person-connected peers, as well as the export
and ownership experience of same-building peers (not reported in
table), robustly predicts ﬁrm importing. Thus our results are robust to
plausible changes in sample deﬁnitions.
A.2. Mover design, export spillovers and other speciﬁcations
Mover design.Table A4 presents summary statistics about the data
we use in the mover design of Section 3.3. The table shows that almost
half of all incumbent ﬁrms—deﬁned as ﬁrms which stay in the same
building from one year to the next—experience a ﬁrm moving intoDependent variable: importing
(1) (2)
Event-year 1 0.38*** 0.12
* Experienced mover in building (0.11) (0.13)
Event-year 2 0.83*** 0.38*
* Experienced mover in building (0.18) (0.23)
Event-year 3 0.98*** 0.65**
* Experienced mover in building (0.23) (0.30)
Event-year 4 1.29*** 0.78**
* Experienced mover in building (0.31) (0.38)
Event-year N ≥ 5 1.33*** 0.73
* Experienced mover in building (0.45) (0.55)
Event-year indicators Yes No
Firm-year FE No Yes
Country-year FE No Yes
Observations 1,101,848 1,101,848
Notes: Sample includesﬁrm-country pairs in years after amoverﬁrmentered the building
of the ﬁrm, conditional on no incumbent ﬁrm in the building imported from the country
before that. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm importing from the country.
Right-hand side variables are event-year indicators showing the move occurred N years
ago, interacted with a country-speciﬁc experience indicator for the mover. We winsorize
event-years at 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients
are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels:
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Table A6
Peer effect in exporting behavior.
Dependent variable: starting to export Type of other experience
Importer Owner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peers with export experience in:
same building 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
neighbor building 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cross-street building 0.04 0.04 0.05* 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
person network 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
ownership network 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.48***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Peers with other experience in:
same building 0.05** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03)
neighbor building 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
cross-street building −0.03 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
person network 0.09 0.58
(0.09) (0.36)
ownership network 0.09** 0.12
(0.04) (0.08)
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,772,739 3,772,739 3,772,739 3,772,739 3,772,739 3,772,739
Notes: Sample includesﬁrm-country pairs in years inwhich theﬁrmhas not exported to the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm starting to export
to the country in thegiven year. Right-hand side variables are indicators for speciﬁc types of peerswith prior country-speciﬁc export experience, aswell as import experience in column (5)
or country-speciﬁc owners in column (6). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signif-
icance levels: *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Table A7
Heterogeneity of peer effect by peer success in importing.
Dependent variable: starting to
import
Recent successful
experience
Length of experience
measured by
Speciﬁcation: number of
years
number of
recent years
(1) (2) (3)
Same-building importer peers 0.17*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03)
Same-building successful
importer peers
0.35***
#
(0.05)
Same-building non-successful
importer peers
0.20***
(0.03)
Length of peers' import
experience in same building
0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
Other types of experienced peers No Yes Yes
Other types of experienced peers
by import success
Yes No No
Length of import experience of
other peer types
No Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,778,517 3,778,517 3,778,517
Notes: Sample includes ﬁrm-country pairs in years in which the ﬁrm has not imported
from the country by the previous year. Dependent variable is an indicator for the ﬁrm
starting to import from the country in the given year. Right-hand side variables are indica-
tors for peers with prior country-speciﬁc import experience by peer success in importing
in column (1) and addingmaximum length of peer experience beyond a single year in col-
umn (2)–(3). A peer is successful if it imports from the country at least twice in the period
[t− 2,t]. We consider only recent continuous experience allowing for single-year gaps in
column (3). Other types of peers refer to all other (non-same-building) peer categories in
Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by building. Coefﬁcients are multi-
plied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p b
0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
#
denotes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from that
of the other group at 5%.
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with previous import experience. 88% of the incumbents are on ad-
dresses with no import experience from at least one of the four coun-
tries. Almost half of these ﬁrms have a mover coming into the
building, and for about 5% of these ﬁrms themover has country-speciﬁc
experience that did not exist at the address. 22% of the addresses have
no import experience from one of the countries and attract a mover
ﬁrm, and 2% attract an experienced mover. These numbers show that
there are many observations in many distinct addresses which our
mover research design can exploit.
Table A5 presents the same estimation results we show in Fig. 1. We
include the table here to show the precise value of the point estimates
and the standard errors.
Export spillovers.Table A6 shows estimates for export spillovers,
using the same identiﬁcation strategy with which we estimate import
spillovers in our ﬁrst research design of Section 3.2. As we discuss in
Section 3.4, spillover patterns and magnitudes are comparable to
those of import spillovers.
Other speciﬁcation checks. In Table O10 of the Online Appendix we
explore whether spillovers affect not only the decision to import but
also the duration and volume of importing. In our data we do not ﬁnd
a clear evidence for either.
A.3. Additional speciﬁcation for heterogeneity of peer effect
Here we present a result on heterogeneity by the quality / success of
the peer's import experience. We start with a measure that deﬁnes a
peer as a “successful” importer from country c in year t if it has imported
from c in at least two years within the three-year period [t− 1,t + 1].
Column 1 in Table A7 shows that successful importers have an addi-
tional diffusion effect relative to peers with different import patterns,
consistent with the idea that these importers have more valuable
knowledge. In column2wemeasure successwith the length of peer im-
port experience, measured as the maximum number of years during
258 M. Bisztray et al. / Journal of International Economics 115 (2018) 242–258which a peer ﬁrm imported from country cminus one, so that we can
measure the effect of an additional year of experience. And in column
3 we report a similar speciﬁcation in which length of experience is the
longest continuous import experience allowing for single-year gaps.
Both of these speciﬁcations show that longer import experience by the
peer is associated with higher adoption. Thus overall we ﬁnd that
more successful importers, perhaps because they havemore import-re-
lated knowledge, generate higher spillovers.
Appendix B. Social multiplier calculations
This subsection shows how to calculate the 5-year social multiplier
using a simple model of knowledge ﬂows affecting import entry. Con-
sider a building with Nllow-productivity and Nhhigh-productivity
ﬁrms. The states of the Markov process describing the dynamics of
importing deﬁned in Section 5 can be represented as (ml,mh), where
ml is the number of low-productivity importers, mh is the number of
high-productivity importers, and ml ∈ 0, 1, …, Nl andmh ∈ 0, 1, …, Nh.
Let AðN
l ;NhÞdenote the transition matrix for this process. The transition
probability from state (m1l , m1h) to (m2l ,m2h), denoted a
ðNl ;NhÞ
ðml1 ;mh1Þ;ðml2 ;mh2Þ
, is
deﬁned as follows. When (m1l ≤m2l) and (m1h ≤m2h), we have:
a
Nl ;Nhð Þ
ml1 ;m
h
1ð Þ; ml2 ;mh2ð Þ ¼
Nl−ml1
ml2−m
l
1
 
 pl þml1  βll þmh1  βlh
 ml2−ml1 
1−pl−ml1  βll−mh1  βlh
 Nl−ml2 
Nh−mh1
mh2−m
h
1
 
 ph þml1  βhl þmh1  βhh
 mh2−mh1 
1−ph−ml1  βhl−mh1  βhh
 Nh−mh2 :
ð8Þ
In all other cases we have aðN
l ;NhÞ
ðml1 ;mh1Þ;ðml2 ;mh2Þ
=0. In the expression pl de-
notes the baseline probability of starting to import for a low-, and ph for
a high-productivityﬁrm.βgg′ is the estimated effect of an additional peer
in productivity group g′ on the import entry probability of a ﬁrm in pro-
ductivity group g, with g, g′ ∈ {l,h}.
The 5-year transition matrix is given by (AðN
l ;NhÞ)5, with elements
aðN
l ;NhÞ5
ðml1 ;mh1Þ;ðml2 ;mh2Þ
. Then the expected number of importers conditional on
an initial state (ml,mh) is
XNl
kl¼ml
XNh
kh¼mh
kl þ kh
 
 a N
l ;Nhð Þ5
ml ;mhð Þ; kl ;khð Þ: ð9Þ
It follows that the numerator of our social multiplier (7) for ﬁrm i on
address a starting to import from country c can be computed as
XNla ið Þ;s
kl¼Mc;la ið Þ;sþIg ið Þ¼l
XNha ið Þ;s
kh¼Mc;ha ið Þ;sþIg ið Þ¼h
kl þ kh
 
 a N
l
a ið Þ;s ;N
h
a ið Þ;sð Þ5
Mc;la ið Þ;sþIg ið Þ¼l ;M
c;h
a ið Þ;sþIg ið Þ¼h
 
; kl ;khð Þ
−
−
XNla ið Þ;s
kl¼Mc;la ið Þ;s
XNha ið Þ;s
kh¼Mc;ha ið Þ;s
kl þ kh
 
 a N
l
a ið Þ;s ;N
h
a ið Þ;sð Þ5
Mc;la ið Þ;s ;M
c;h
a ið Þ;s
 
; kl ;khð Þ
;
ð10Þ
where Mc, ga(i), s is the number of peers in productivity group g in the
building of ﬁrm i in year s importing from country c; Ig(i)=g is an indica-
tor for ﬁrm i being in productivity group g; and Nga(i), s is the number
of ﬁrms in productivity group g in the building of ﬁrm i in year s, with
g ∈ {l,h}. We use the same formula for the denominator but set the
βgg′ parameters to zero.References
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